Western New England Law Review
Volume 4 4 (1981-1982)
Issue 1

Article 3

1-1-1981

EVIDENCE—AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE
ERODED EXCLUSIONARY
RULE—FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE
608(b)
Stuart R. Friedman

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
Recommended Citation
Stuart R. Friedman, EVIDENCE—AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE ERODED EXCLUSIONARY RULE—FEDERAL RULE OF
EVIDENCE 608(b), 4 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 133 (1981), http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol4/iss1/3

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.

NOTES
EVIDENCE-AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE ERODED EXCLUSIONARY
RULE-FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 608(b)

I.

INTRODUCTION

The illegal seizure of a size 38-40, medium tee shirt resulted in
the conviction of Attorney J. Lee Havens for importing cocaine in
violation of federal law.' The government, absent a warrant, confis
cated the tee shirt in contravention of the fourth amendment's bar
against unreasonable searches and seizures. 2 Consequently, the tee
shirt was considered tainted evidence because it was procured by il
legal police conduct. 3 In United States v. Havens,4 however, the gov
ernment was permitted to use the tee shirt, despite its tainted
character, to impeach the accused. Havens evinced further erosion
of the exclusionary rule of evidence. The exclusionary rule is an in
strument used to protect the personal liberties guaranteed by the
fourths and fifth6 amendments to the United States Constitution by
barring the prosecution's use of evidence obtained through improper
police conduct.'
Since it first was enunciated, 8 the exclusionary principle has
been qualified to bar tainted evidence only from the prosecution's
1. U~ted States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980). Defendant also was convicted of
conspiring to import cocaine and of knowingly and intentionally possessing a controlled
.
substance. Id at 621.
2.
The right of the people to be secure in their ~rsons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, Shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but u~n probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma
tion, and particularly descnbing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to 6e seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980).
4. 446 U.S. 620 (1980).
5. See note 2 supra.
6. "[N]or shall any person. . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
7. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
8. Id at 392.
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case-in-chief. The case-in-chief consists of the substantive proof
presented to determine a defendant's guilt or innocence with respect
to the crimes charged. 9 The United States Supreme Court has per
mitted the use of evidence to impeach a defendant-witness regarding
matters collateral lO to the case-in-chief. Further, the Court permit
ted the use of such tainted evidence to impeach the accused in mat
ters directly related to, but still outside, the formal scope of the
prosecution's case-in-chief.11
A more recently created rule concerned with the exclusion of
evidence is Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) (rule 608(b».l2 Rule
608(b) is not addressed specifically to situations involving tainted ev
idence. Rather, it addresses the exclusion of evidence concerning
certain instances of a witness' prior conduct: By regarding a defend
ant-witness' behavior in the fact paradigms surrounding the tainted
evidence as a specific instance of conduct, cases otherwise invoking
the exclusionary rule may come within the purview of rule 608(b).
This note will briefly trace the history of the exclusionary rule,
including the current judicial trend toward reducing the rule's scope.
The mechanics of rule 608(b) will then be examined. This examina
tion will be followed by an analysis of the overlap of the exclusion
ary rule and rule 608(b). Finally, rule 608(b) will be evaluated as a
method of excluding evidence that otherwise would be admissible
due to the receding scope of the exclusionary rule.
II.

EROSION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

The United States Supreme Court first articulated the exclu
sionary rule in Weeks v. United States, 13 in which it overturned a
conviction for illegal use of the mails. The Court was very con
cerned with the use of evidence obtained as a result of entry into
Weeks' residence by police who then proceeded, in violation of the
fourth amendment, to seize personal effects of defendant. 14 The
Court determined that the trial judge had improperly allowed the
prosecution to use these personal effects as evidence against defend
9. The case-in-chief, also known as the direct case, is "[t]hat part of a trial in which
the party with the initial burden of proof presents his evidence after which he rests."
BLACK'S LAW DICflONARY 196 (5th ed. 1979).
10. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954); see notes 24 & 26 infra and ac
companying text.
11. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
12. FED. R. EVID. 608(b); see text accompanying note 43 infra.
13. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
14. Id. at 386.
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ant. IS The Court sought simultaneously to discourage police impro
priety and to protect judicial integrity by barring the illegally
obtained evidence. 16 In declaring the interrelation of these two con
cerns the Court stated:
The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the coun
try to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and en
forced confessions, the latter often obtained after subjecting
accused persons to unwarranted practices destructive of rights se
cured by the Federal Constitution, should find no sanction in the
judgments of the courts. . . . 17

The exclusionary rule was further strengthened in 1920 by
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 18 in which the Court
barred the government's indirect use of illegally seized evidence.
Documents were taken from petitioner's office pursuant to an invalid
subpoena and subsequently were returned by order of the trial court.
The government then sought to use the information it had obtained
through the illegal seizure. 19 To do so, the Court reasoned, "reduces
the Fourth Amendment to a form of words."20 Unless the evidence
was obtained independently, it could "not be used at all" whether
presented before the court or not. 21"
. Five years later, in Agnello v. United States,22 the Supreme
Court barred the government from presenting cocaine illegally
seized from defendant's house. The evidence was barred, not only
from the government's case-in-chief, but also from the government's
attempt to impeach defendant. 23
Although the exclusionary rule originally was used as an abso
lute bar to admission of tainted evidence, as exemplified by Agnello,
policy considerations have prompted exceptions to that rule. The
primary reason for the exceptions is the Court's intent to prevent a
defendant from shielding his perjury behind the government's disa
bility to present tainted evidence. Based on this consideration, the
Supreme Court, in Walder v. United States, 24 upheld the admission
15. Id at 398.
16. Id at 392.
17. Id
18. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
19. Id at 390-91.
20. Id at 392.
21. Id
22. 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
23. Id at 35.
24. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
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of rebuttal testimony concerning illegally seized heroin.25 The Court
reasoned that to prevent the government from rebutting Walder's
sweeping denial on direct examination, that he dealt in or possessed
any narCotics, would extend the Weeks doctrine to the point of per
verting the fourth amendment. 26 Thus, the door was opened for the
prosecution's limited use of tainted evidence for impeachment pur
poses in certain situations.
.
Statements made in the absence of Miranda warnings27 were
used to impeach defendant in Harris v. New York. 28 In contrast to
Walder, in which defendant was impeached on collateral matters,
Harris was impeached on matters included in his testimony on cross
examination: matters which focused more directly on the crimes
charged. 29 Harris' conviction for selling heroin to undercover agents
was upheld in the Court's further attempt to expose perjured testi
mony of the accused.30
Following Harris, it was a short step for the Supreme Court to
permit illegally obtained evidence to impeach a defendant regarding
matters directly related to the crimes charged yet not part of the
prosecutor's case-in-chief. In Oregon v. Hass,31 defendant's state
ments made subsequent to defective Mirando warnings were used to
convict Hass of stealing a bicycle from a residential garage. Hass
denied, on both direct and cross-examination, that he had known the
location from which the bicycle was taken.32 As in Harris, the
Supreme Court believed that" '[a]ssuming that the exclusionary rule
has a deterrent effect on proscribed police conduct, sufficient deter
rence flows when the evidence in question is made unavailable to the
prosecution in its case in chief.' "33
Havens is the most recent decision in this line. The Supreme
25. Id at 65.
26. Id
27. These warnings are derived from Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
When the police take an individual into custody or otherwise deprive him of his freedom
in a significant manner he is entitled to a warning prior to questioning. The warning
must include notification and the individual must have actual knowledge that: 1) He has
the right to remain silent; 2) anything he says can be used against him in a court of law;
3) he has the right to the presence of an attorney; and, 4) if he cannot afford an attorney,
one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning, should he so desire. Id at 467
73.
28. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
29. Id at 225.
30. Id at 226.
31. 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
32. Id at 716-17.
33. Id at 721 (quoting Harris, 401 U.S. at 225).
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Court held that "a defendant's statements made in response to
proper cross-examination ... are subject to otherwise proper im
peachment by the government, albeit by evidence that has been ille
gally obtained that is inadmissible on the government's direct case,
or otherwise, as substantive evidence of guilt."34 At the time of his
arrest, Havens was carrying in his suitcase a tee shirt with holes cut
out. The holes corresponded to swatches sewn onto a shirt worn by a
coconspirator who previously had been arrested. 3s The swatches
served as makeshift pockets which contained cocaine smuggled into
Miami International Airport from Lima, Peru. Havens was searched
without a warrant and his tee shirt was confiscated. 36 The evidence
was subsequently suppressed pursuant to a motion prior to trial. 37
The issue of the confiscation of the cut-out tee shirt was raised ini
tially by the government on cross-examination. 38 Havens there de
nied knowing that the tee shirt was in his suitcase. The trial court
permitted the prosecution to enter the tee shirt as evidence to rebut
defendant's denial. 39
As a result of these recent decisions, the early development and
strengthening of the exclusionary rule has been eclipsed by qualifica
tions and exceptions. The rule no 16nger stands in absolute terms to
protect a defendant at trial from the potential effect of tainted evi
dence. As a more pandemic consequence, the effectiveness of the
exclusionary rule as a countermeasure to police misconduct may be
reduced, since improperly procured evidence can now be used
against a defendant in limited circumstances.
The United States Supreme Court is unlikely to retreat from its
current interpretation restricting the use of the exclusionary rule.40
Limiting the use of the rule, however, does not necessarily preclude
the use of other rules of evidence to confront problems concerning
tainted evidence.41 Rule 608(b) is one alternative method that can
be employed to close some of the technical loopholes created by the
current interpretations that limit the use of the exclusionary rule.
Such loopholes inure to the benefit of law enforcement officials, the
34. 446 U.S. at 627·28.
35. Id at 621·22.
36. Id at 622.
37. Id
38. Id at 622·23.
39. Id at 623.
40. See Kaplan, TIre Limits of lite Exclusionary RlIIe. 26 STAN. L. REv. 1027
(1974). See generally text accompanying notes 1·39 supra.
41. See, e.g.. FED. R. EVID. 403; FED. R. EVID. 404; FED. R. EVlD. 609.
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very objects against whom the rule originally was designed to
protect.

III.

RULE

608(b)

AND THE EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE

The Federal Rules of Evidence, which became effective in the
Federal Courts on July 1, 1975,42 require that evidence of certain
prior conduct of a witness be excluded from the trial. This principle
of exclusion is embodied in rule 608(b).43
Notwithstanding the use of evidence of prior convictions pursu
ant to Federal Rule of Evidence 609,44 the first sentence of rule
42. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, § 1, 89 Stat. 805.
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of conduct cf a
43.
witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than
conviction of cnme as provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic
evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of
truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the wit
ness (1) concerning his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) con
cerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to
which character the witness being cross-examined has testified.
FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
44. FED. R. EVID. 609 provides:
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a wit
ness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited
from him or established by public record during cross-examination but only if
the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year
under the law under which he was convicted, and the court determines that the
probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the
defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the pun
ishment.
(b) Time limit. Evidence ofa conviction under this rule is not admissible
if a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or
of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction,
whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of jus
tice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and
circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. However, evidence
of a conviction more than 10 years old as calculated herein, is not admissible
unless the proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance written notice
of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair opportu
nity to contest the use of such evidence.
(c) Effect of pardon, annulment, or certificate of rehabilitation. Evidence
of a conviction is not admissible under this rule if (1) the conviction has been
the subject of a pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other
equivalent procedure based on a finding of the rehabilitation of the person con
victed, and that person has not been cOnvicted of a subsequent crime which was
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, or (2) the convic
tion has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent procedure
based on a finding of innocence.
(d) Juvenile adjudications. Evidence of juvenile adjudications is gener
ally not admissible under this rule. The court may, however, in a criminal case
allow evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the accused if
conviction of the offense would be admissible to attack the credibility of an
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608(b) enunciates a general rule prohibiting proof, by extrinsic evi
dence, of specific instances of conduct for impeaching or supporting
a witness' credibility. The second sentence immediately carves an
exception to the general rule of exclusion. There have been signifi
cant differences, however, in the interpretation of this exception by
the circuit courts. In some cases, courts within the same jurisdiction
have disagreed. 45
The prevailing interpretation46 of the exception recognizes an
attorney's right to inquire of a witness, on cross-examination only,
prior specific instances of conduct. The rule, under this view, stops
short of allowing the cross-examiner the liberty of introducing ex
trinsic evidence to rebut a witness' answer.47 In addition, the cross
examiner is limited to an inquiry into the witness' general credibility.
Though restricted, cross-examination is far from enervated. In prac
tice, considerable prejudice and confusion may arise merely from the
adult and the court is satisfied that admission in evidence is necessary for a fair
determination of the issue of guilt or innocence. . . .
Id

45. Of the ten circuits that have interpreted the exception, the Fourth, Seventh,
Eighth, and Tenth have barred extrinsic evidence under rule 608(b), while the First and
Second Circuits have admitted it. The Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have demon
strated confusion through inconsistent holdings. See cases cited notes 46 & 54 infra.
46. See, e.g., United States v. Bosley, 615 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1980); United States
v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978), urI. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979); United States
v. Werbrouck, 589 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 962 (1979); United
States v. Herzberg, 558 F.2d 1219 (5th Cir.), urt. denied, 434 U.S. 930 (1977); United
States v. Turquitt, 557 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Wood, 550 F.2d 435 (9th
Cir. 1976); United States v. Brown, 547 F.2d 438 (8th Cir.), cerl. denied, sub nom. United
States v. Hendrix, 430 U.S. 937 (1977); United States v. Cluck, 544 F.2d 195 (5th Cir.
1976); United States v. Harris, 542 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1976), cerl. denied, sub nom. Clay
v. United States, 430 U.S. 934 (1977); United States v. Estell, 539 F.2d 697 (10th Cir.),
cerl. denied, 429 U.S. 982 (1976); United States v. Blackshire, 538 F.2d 569 (4th Cir.),
cerl. denied, sub nom. Barnes v. United States, 429 U.S. 840 (1976); United States v. Cox,
536 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1976) (decided under the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence);
United States v. Wigoda, 521 F.2d 1221 (7th Cir. 1975), cerl. denied, 424 U.S. 949 (1976);
United States v. Banks, 520 F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Simmons, 444 F.
Supp. 500 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
47. United States v. Bosley, 615 F.2d 1274, 1277 (9th Cir. 1980); 3 J. WEINSTEIN &
M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE' 608(05), at 608-22 (1981).
Even those commentators normally supportive of a liberal reading of rule 608(b)
would stop short of allowing extrinsic evidence to incriminate the criminal defendant.
And where the accused has made assertions in his direct testimony which
might be proved wrong by evidence of other misdeeds, hence impeaching the
accused by contradiction, courts have held that the self-incrimination privilege
does not shield him from inquiry into such matters, necessarily meaning that
Rule 608(b) does not stand in the way either.
3 D. LoUISELL & C. MEULLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 310 (1979) (footnote omitted) (em
phasis added).
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method of inquiry. "[T]he very question itself can convey the theo
retically barred information to the jury. A skillful but unscrupulous
cross-examiner can. . . ask the witness about incidents in his life in
such detail ... as to render his denials completely suspect."48
In United States v. Herman,49 representative of the majority
view of rule 608(b), defendant, a former state court magistrate, was
convicted of accepting bribes from a bail bonding firm..· This consti
tuted violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza
tions Act. SO After an unsuccessful attempt during its case-in-chiefto
introduce a bail bond agency operator's testimony that defendant
had accepted payments from him, the government tried to introduce
this evidence in rebuttal. sl The trial court admitted the evidence for
the limited purpose of rebutting the character evidence offered by
defendant. S2 The court of appeals overturned the conviction and
ruled that the rebuttal testimony was prohibited by the express pro
visions of rule 608(b). S3
A minorityS4 of circuit courts has eschewed a strict reading of
the rule 608(b) limitation on the use of extrinsic evidence. These
courts believe that restricting a cross-examiner to mere inquiry with
out recourse to proof by extrinsic means is an improper manifesta
tion of congressional intent. ss Implicit in this interpretation is the
idea that the focus of the limitation within rule 608(b) is upon the
scope of cross-examination. Since reliance upon extrinsic evidence is
generally within the full scope of permissible cross-examination;
under the minority interpretation, rule 608(b) does not act· to pre
clude such evidence. S6
The minority view is exemplified by the Third Circuit's opinion
48. 3 1. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 47, at 608-26 (footnote omitted).
"The possibility of abuse has led a minority of American jurisdictions to forbid all cross
examination as to particular misconduct not the subject of convictions." Id. at 608-26;
see id. at n.6.
49. 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979).
50. Id. at 1194.
51. Id. at 1195.
52. Id. at 1196.
53. Id.
54. E.g., Carter v. Hewitt, 617 F.2d 961 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Opager,
589 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Rios Ruiz, 579 F.2d 670 (1st Cir. 1978);
United States v. Benedetto, 571 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Batts, 558 F.2d
513 (9th Cir. 1977), withdrawn and mod!fted, 573 F.2d 599 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
859 (1978).
55. United States v. Batts, 558 F.ld 513, 517 (9th Cir. 1977), withdrawn and modi
fied, 573 F.ld 599 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 859 (1978).
56. See Advisory Comm. Note, Fed. R. Evid. 608(b).
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in Carter v. Hewitt 57 and the Fifth Circuit's opinion in United States
v. Opager. 58 In Hewitt, plaintiff, an inmate at a state prison, charged
that three prison guards had severely beaten' him during a routine
search of his cell. 59 While being cross-examined, plaintiff was shown
a letter that he had authored indicating that the allegations against
the guards were part of a sham plot " 'to establish a pattern of bar
baric brutal harassment . . . .'''60 The letter, extrinisic evidence
used for impeachment purposes, thus was entered into the trial
record.
The court of appeals in Opager reversed defendant's conviction
for violating federal narcotics laws. 61 A former coworker of defend
ant testified that Opager had used and sold cocaine during the years
they had worked together. 62 The defense sought to impeach the
state's witness by offering business records which demonstrated that
Opager and the witness had not worked together during the period
alleged by the prosecution. 63 The court of appeals concluded that
the district court erred in applying rule 608(b) to determine the ad
missibility of the business records. 64
Despite the general confusion with regard to the interpretation
of rule 608(b),65 it is possible nevertheless to reconcile the divergent
views when applying the rule specifically to the exclusion of illegally
obtained evidence. To understand the operation of rule 608(b) in
cases involving tainted evidence, however, it is necessary to examine
the interplay between rule 608(b) and the exclusionary rule.
IV.

OVERLAP OF RULE

608(b)

AND THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

Rule 608(b) makes no reference to the exclusion of evidence
tainted by illegal searches and seizures or violations of the Miranda
rule. The Advisory Committee Notes66 and legislative history67 of
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

617 F.2d 961 (3d Cir. 1980).
589 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1979).
617 F.2d at 963.
Id at 964-65.
589 F.2d at 806.
Id at SOl.
Id
64. Id
65. Compare Carter v. Hewitt, 617 F.2d 961 (3d Cir. 1980) with United States v.
Herman, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1975); compare United States v. Opager, 589 F.2d 799
(5th Cir. 1979) wilh United States v. Henberg, 558 F.2d 1219 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 930 (1977); compare United States v. Batts, 55S F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1977), withdrawn
and mod!fted, 573 F.2d 599 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. S59 (1978) with United States
v. Bosley, 615 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1980).
66. Advisory Comm. Note, FED. R. EVID. 6OS(b).
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rule 608(b) similarly are silent with respect to the effects of improp
erly obtained evidence. 68 The absence of such cross-reference lends
support to the notion that the application of rule 608(b), a creation of
the legislature, was not intended to be preempted by the judicially
created exclusionary doctrine. The two rules can operate indepen
dently. The exclusionary rule specifically bars evidence subject to
suppression for violations of the fourth amendment. Rule 608(b) fo
cuses on the use of extrinsic evidence for specific instances of con
duct relevant to a witness' veracity.69 Extrinsic evidence in the
context of rule 608(b) entails proof by means outside the witness'
own testimony. It is often in the form of testimony by a rebuttal
witness or physical exhibits.
The exclusionary rule applies specifically to criminal defend
ants, while rule 608(b) does not expressly apply to defendants but
rather, to witnesses in general. In addition, the law, both prior70 and
subsequent71 to the effective date of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
has recognized that the mechanics involved when a criminal defend
ant testifies are similar to those involving other types of witnesses.
Thus, criminal defendants necessarily are included in this broad cat
egory. The accused is obliged to speak truthfully and accurately
when taking the stand and is subject to the normal character im
peachment through cross-examination and rebuttal. 72 A blanket
principle which equates defendants with other witnesses, however,
may be undesirable since, in many circumstances, "[t]here is a sub-·
stantial danger that the jury will believe that the defendant is a bad
67. For general legislative history of Federal Rules of Evidence, see Proposed Fed
eral Rules ofEvidence: Hearings on H.R. .5463 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-27,374-76 (1974); Proposed Federal Rules ofEvidence: Hearings on
H.R. .5463 Before the House Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedure of the Comm. on
the Judiciary 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 46-62 (1973) (Supp.) [hereinafter cited as House Sub
committee Hearings); Proposed Federal Rules ofEvidence: Hearings on H.R. .5463 Before
the Spec. Subcomm. on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws of the Comm. on the Judiciary,
93 Cong., 2d Sess. 1-11,91-99,312-23,387-88,517-44 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Special
Subcommittee Hearings); H.R. CONF. REp. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1974), re
printed in (1974) U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7098; H.R. REp. No. 650, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. I (1973), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7075; S. REp. No. 1277,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1(1974), reprintedin (1974) U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7051; 120
CONGo REc. 37075-84 (1974); id. at 1413-22, 2266-2377, HI2,253-59 (daily ed. Dec. 18,
1974).
68. See sources cited note 67 supra. But see House Subcommittee Hearings, supra
note 61, at 46-48.
69. See note 43 supra.
70. United States V. Turquitt, 557 F.2d 464, 471 (5th Cir. 1977).
71. Oregon V. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 721-22 (1975).
72. United States V. Davenport, 449 F.2d 696, 700 (5th Cir. 1971).
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man deserving of punishment even if he did not do the particular act
charged."73 This danger is especially apparent in a case such as
Walder, where defendant was indicted previously for similar
offenses.
A. Effect

of Collateral Matters

Although the focal points of the two rules vary, the operation of
rule 608(b) may converge with that of the exclusionary rule in cer
tain situations. The general exclusionary policy of rule 608(b) in
avoiding unnecessary minitrials on collateral issues74 applies to in
stances involving tainted evidence where such evidence is extrinsic
and relates to specific misdeeds of a witness. 75 Under either role,
evidence identified as being both illegally obtained and extrinsic
would be restricted from use in the prosecution's case-in-chief.
The policy underlying rule 608(b) seeks to save the trial from
being encumbered by matters only collaterally related to the issues
being litigated. 76 The term "collateral" in the context of rule 608(b)
assumes a different sense than its use with respect to the exclusionary
rule. 77 A collateral matter under the exclusionary rule is one that is
73. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 47, at 608-35. A pragmatic approach
entails a
rulling) in advance that the attacks on the defendant through bad acts will be
limited in order to induce him to take the stand; to prevent his appearing in a
false light compared to other witnesses, the court may ask that similar attacks
be limited against the people's main witness.
Id at 608-35-36. But see Special Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 61, at 316 (memo
randum of G. Robert Blakely).
74. Carter v. Hewitt, 617 F.2d 961, 971 (3d Cir. 1980); 3 D. LoUISELL & C. MEUL
LER, supra note 46, § 306.
75. Few courts of appeals have considered cases dealing with the exclusionary rule
in conjunction with rule 608(b). See, e.g., United States v. Benedetto, 571 F.2d 1246,
1250 n.5 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Batts, 558 F.2d 513, 520 (9th Cir. 1977) (Ken
nedy, J., dissenting), withdrawn and modified, 573 F.2d 599 (9th Cir.), cerro denied,439
U.S. 859 (1978).
Although the actual "misconduct" is perpetrated by the police in such circum
stances, some improper conduct is implicated with respect to the witness. An illegal
search and seizure, for example, may implicate the witness' possession of illicit narcotics.
The "specific instance of conduct" here must necessarily focus upon the illicit possession
rather than upon the illegal search and seizure itself.
76. 3 D. LoUlSELL & C. MEULLER, supra note 46, § 306.
77. Although under the exclusionary rule the United States Supreme Court has
acknowledged a distinction between matters that are collateral and those that are directly
related to the elements of a case, the effect has been the same for both. The Court in
Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975), and in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) .
treated matters directly related to the case in a way similar to its treatment of collateral
matters in Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1925). But see 401 U.S. at 227 (Bren
nan, J., dissenting).
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outside the government's case-in-chief.7 8 Impeachment is the exclu
sionary rule's primary form of collateral matter since it often occurs
after the government rests its case-in-chief. Thus, impeachment may
focus upon the substantive issues of the trial, as well as upon more
tangential topics that are otherwise admissibl~.
Under rule 608(b), however, an issue's collateral makeup is de
termined, not by its relation to the case-in-chief, but rather by its
importance, necessity, and probative value in relation to a witness'
veracity or to the central issues of the case. 79 This means that matter
that is collateral but admissible under the exclusionary rule, may
also be collateral under rule 608(b). Since the inverse of the relation
ship is not necessarily true, the term "collateral" as used under rule
608(b) is of narrower scope than under the exclusionary rule. It is
conceivable that tainted evidence that otherwise may be admissible
in the government's impeachment case under the exclusionary rule
may be barred as being collateral to a particular witness' veracity or
to the central issues in the case under rule 608(b).
In Harris, the Supreme Court permitted the admission of ille
gally obtained evidence for collateral purposes provided that the evi
dence's trustworthiness satisfied legal standards. 80 Determining
satisfaction of legal standards in this sense could correspond pre
cisely to the type of minitrial on collateral matter which the legisla
ture sought to avoid with rule 608(b). Rule 608(b) requires merely a
good faith standard to be imposed on the cross-examiner regarding
the factual predicate of the alleged prior misconduct. 81 The good
faith requirement strongly indicates that adjudicating trustworthi
ness of evidence is not within the purview of the rule. This may
require, for example, testimony by the arresting police officers that
statements made or acts done in the absence of proper Miranda
warnings were not involuntary or the result of coercion. 82 The result
78. See generally United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980); Oregon v. Hass,
420 U.S. 714 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); Walder v. United States,
347 U.S. 62 (1954); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925); Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
79. See 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 47, at 608-24.
80. 401 U.S. at 224. See also Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722 (1975) (citing
Harris, 401 U.S. at 222).
81. United States v. Bright, 588 F.2d 504, 511-12 (5th Cir.), cerro denied, sub nom.
Whitten v. United States, 440 U.S. 972 (1979). Although Brigh' rests solely on rule 403,
the considerations embodied in this rule are inherent in rule 608(b). See Advisory
Comm. Note, FED. R. EVlD. 608(b).
82. See 420 U.S. at 723; 401 U.S. at 224.
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of focusing on an issue's collateral nature is to bar under rule 608(b)
evidence that currently is admissible under the exclusionary rule.
B. Dynamics of Defendant's Denial
An analysis of several of the cases that have interpreted rule

608(b) indicates that some courts consider it of prime importance to
discern the dynamics relating to a defendant's denial. It is this de
nial which is the act that ultimately triggers rule 608(b), as well as
the exclusionary principle. 83 These dynamics call for scrutiny of the
timing, method, and extent of the denial. Timing concerns whether
the denial was made during the defendant's direct testimony or on
cross-examination. The method of denial refers to whether the de
fendant's statement was uttered voluntarily or elicited by the cross
examiner. Extent of denial classifies the denial as either specific and
clear or general and ambiguous. The following discussion analyzes
the operation of this denial-dynamics approach.
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Batts,84 interpreted rule
608(b) so that extrinsic evidence would be admissible to refute a de
fendant's denial of prior misconduct when that evidence would cast
his denial testimony in a "false light"8S before the jury. Batts' direct
testimony included a general account of ~he events surrounding his
arrest for importation of, and possession with intent to distribute,
hashish. 86 During cross-examination, Batts was asked a series of
questions concerning a "coke spoon" he was wearing on a necklace
at the time of his arrest. 87 The questioning ultimately extracted a
denial by Batts of any knowledge concerning the use of cocaine. The
prosecution was aware that, seven months prior to his arrest in the
instant action, defendant had sold cocaine to an undercover agent. 88
Although evidence of the cocaine sale was suppressed,89 the prosecu
tion successfully offered rebuttal testimony concerning Batts' prior
83. See United States v. Bosley, 615 F.2d 1274, 1276-77 (9th Cir. 1980); Carter v.
Hewitt, 617 F.2d 961, 971 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Opager, 589 F.2d 799,802 (5th
Cir. 1979); United States v. Benedetto, 571 F.2d 1246, 1249-50 n.5 (2d Cir. 1978); United
States v. Herzberg, 558 F.2d 1219, 1223-24 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 930 (1977);
United States v. Batts, 558 F.2d 513, 516 (9th Cir. 1977), withdrawn and modtfted, 573
F.2d 599 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 859 (1978).
84. 558 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1977), withdrawn and mod!fted, 573 F.2d 599 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 859 (1978).
85. 558 F.2d at 517.
86. Id at 515.
87. Id at 516.
88. Id
89. Id The evidence was suppressed as a consequence of an illegal search and
seizure and thus, the indictment was dismissed.
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involvement with cocaine. 90
A major problem with the majority's opinion in Batts relates to
the link between direct and cross-examination of defendant. The
court was satisfied that it was "at least arguable that appellant [Batts]
had opened up the subject area [of cocaine use) by testifying to other
contemporaneous events at the port of entry."91 It is apparent, con
trary to the court's perception, that the illegally seized evidence was
related to a line of inquiry and a subsequent denial initiated by the
prosecution on cross-examination. In no way was even a general de
nial implicit in defendant's direct testimony. Batts condones the use
of suppressed evidence as a specific instance of conduct predicated
upon tenuous links between a defendant's direct testimony and his
cross-examination. 92
In a more recent decision, the same circuit addressed a situation
similar to that in Batts, although the extrinsic evidence in question
was not subject to any prior suppression. In United States v. Bos
90. Id
91. Id The court then cited Banning v. United States, 130 F.2d 330, 338 (6th Cir.
1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 695 (1943), for the proposition that a cross-examiner has the

right to fill in for the trial court all the details respecting matters brought out by direct
examination. Batts, 558 F.2d at 516 n.6. It would be difficult under such broad rubric to
prevent a talented cross-examiner from cleverly creating some opportunity for a linkage,
thus developing a situation where admission of suppressed evidence would become
commonplace.
92. Bolts first considered that evidence relating to the "coke spoon" was received
in evidence without objection prior to defendant's cross-examination. The court further
stated that defendant's testimony concerning the coke spoon would, nevertheless, have
been admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 611(b). 558 F.2d at 516. This rule
provides in part that "[t]he court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into
additional matters as if on direct examination." FED. R. EVID. 61 I (b).
Rule 608(b), although a rule into which cross-examination is interwoven, does not
encompass the full panoply of power envisioned by the rulemakers in cross-examination.
Cross-examination ordinarily must relate to matters exposed on direct examination. Id
Under rule 608(b), this mere relevancy standard was ultimately replaced by a more limit
ing standard requiring that the specific instances beprobative of veracity. Compare FED.
R. EVID. 608(b) with Prelim. Draft (Mar. 31, 1969), reprinted in 46 F.R.D. 161, 293
(1969). In light of the legislative history of rule 608(b) and the Advisory Committee
Notes, which appear to relate only to rule 61 I (a), the court in Batts erroneously extended
itself on the matter of the scope of cross-examination under rule 608(b). See sources
cited note 67 supra.
Batts was subsequently withdrawn and another opinion substituted which predi
cated the admission of the evidence on rule 404 and not on rule 608(b). United States v.
Batts, 573 F.2d 599 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 859 (1978). See also Comment,
Evidence-Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b)-Illegally Seized Extrinsic Evidence of Prior
Bad Acts of J)efendant Admissible for Impeachment When Exclusion Would J)efeat Pur
pose ofAscertaining Truth. United States v. Batts, 558 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1977), modified
on rehearing, No. 76-2308 (Apr. 13, 1978), 9 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 375 (1978) (criticizing
Batts).
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ley,93 defendant was indicted for distribution of, and conspiracy to
distribute, cocaine. In response to specific questions during cross

examination, Bosley denied having delivered cocaine to anyone. 94
The circuit court reversed the trial judge's ruling that allowed the
government to call a witness in rebuttal. In contrast to Batts, the
government had a stronger case in Bosley since the denial was more
closely related to matters exposed during defendant's direct testi
mony.9S Nevertheless, extrinsic evidence was prohibited. Bosley
noted that defendant's denial was specifically elicited by the govern
ment and, therefore; within the rule 608(b) ban on extrinsic evi
dence. 96 It, however, left open the question whether a different
result would have been reached had the denial been volunteered
during direct testimony or as an unelicited statement on cross-exami
nation. Underlying this question is the further inquiry: What con
stitutes collateral matter under rule 608(b) since extrinsic evidence of
such matter is barred by the rule?
Prior misconduct not resulting in a criminal conviction may be
considered collateral to the instant trial. 97 Yet, a prior misdeed
should attain a higher level of centrality to a case when a defendant
raises the matter on his direct testimon~8 or volunteers it in response
to cross-examination. The important element is that, in both in
stances, the defense is putting the subject in issue. The goal of rule
608(b) is to prevent unnecessary sidetracking on noncentral issues at
trial. Once the sidetracking becomes necessary, as a consequence of
the defense putting the subject at issue, the ban of rule 608(b) should
be lifted since the matter inquired into becomes germaine to the
litigation.
Determining whether a matter has been raised by the defense
should require more than merely "cracking open" the topic. 99 The
statement or denial should be clear and there should be a clear con
tradiction between the defendant's pronouncements and what is
93. 615 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1980).
94. There was a question on appeal whether Bosley's denial referred to deliveries
made at any time or merely during the course of the conspiracy. The court concluded the
latter. Id at 1276-77.
95. Prior to his cross-examination, Bosley stated that he was not involved in the
alleged sale of drugs. Id at 1276.
96. Id at 1277.
97. United States v. Herzberg, 558 F.2d 1219, 1223 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
930 (1977) (extrinsic evidence of prior civil fraud barred during cross-examjnation of
defendant charged with use of mails to defraud).
98. Id
99. Id
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sought to be proved by the proferred evidence. 100 Otherwise, there is
a threat of trying the very issues sought to be avoided under rule
608(b).
A further illustration of the operation of the dynamics analysis
can be drawn from United States v. Benedetto .101 This is a leading
case from the Second Circuit, in which defendant had been con
victed of illegally receiving money in connection with his official du
ties as a government meat inspector. Four witnesses were produced
by the defense to prove that no bribes ever were taken. The trial
judge then permitted the prosecution to call a rebuttal witness to the
stand. lo2 Although Benedetto is among the minority in permitting
rebuttal by the use. of extrinsic evidence, the decision is consistent
with an analysis of rule 608(b) that focuses upon the characteristics
of a defendant's denial. Benedetto stated on direct examination that
he had not accepted bribes.103 On cross-examination, he made a
specific denial with regard to money offered by a particular individ
ual. The court stated that, "[o]nce a witness (especially a defendant
witness) testifies as to any specific fact on direct testimony, the trial
judge has broad discretion to admit extrinsic evidence tending to
contradict the specific statement, even if such statement concerns a
collateral matter in the case."I04 The admission of extrinsic evi
dence, therefore, was warranted since "Benedetto's statement was
closely intertwined with the central issue of this case ... ."IOS
Several courts, however, have barred extrinsic evidence of prior
misconduct in spite of its potential probative value. I06 This result is
more consistent with the plain language of rule 608(b). The notion
that the examiner must ''take the witness' answer" does not limit the
100. Cf Carter v. Hewitt, 617 F.2d 961 (3d Cir. 1980) (extrinsic evidence permitted
where plaintiff inmate admitted writing letter indicating falsehood of claim of brutality
committed by prison guards); United States v. Havens, 592 F.2d 848, 851 (5th Cir. 1979)
(exclusion of suppressed evidence based on constitutional grounds), rev'd, 446 U.S. 620
(1980).
101. 571 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1978).
102. Id at 1248.
103. Id
104. Id at 1250 (citing Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954».
105. Id Benedetto is unclear as to its reliance on rule 608(b). Although the issue
in the case is squarely within the scope of the rule, the decision referred more to matters
identified with reputation and opinion evidence under rule 608(a) than to specific in
stances of conduct under rule 608(b). 571 F.2d at 1250 nn. 5 & 6.
106. See note 40 JUpra; if. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 41, at 608-23
24, 29-30 (inquiry into specific instances of conduct limited by FED. R. EVID. 403 consid
erations to protect witness).
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inquiry; but rather, it prevents the calling of other witnesses in
rebuttal.
The application of rule 608(b), which is predicated on the tim
ing, method, and extent of a defendant's denial, can be employed to
reexamine the cases involving suppressed evidence that were decided
under the exclusionary rule. The results in Walder, Hass, and
Agnello would remain unchanged, while those in Harris and Havens
would be altered. In Walder, defendant voluntarily denied during
direct examination any prior misconduct,107 as did defendant in
Ross. lOS He further .reiterated his clear and complete denial on
cross-examination. I09 In both cases, the evidence would be admissi
ble. In Agnello, the evidence remained excluded since the denial,
albeit a clear one, was elicited on cross-examination only. The col
lateral issue was never raised by defendant's direct testimony.IIO
The eliciting of less than clear denials in both Harris III and
Ravens ll2 militates for excluding the suppressed evidence that ulti- .
mately was admitted in each instance. Consequently, it seems clear
that the analysis of rule 608(b) used by the circuit courts can be ap
plied in certain instances to alter the effects of the exclusionary rule.
C.

Transactional Approach to Rule 608(b)
An alternative to the technical analysis of rule 608(b), which

. centers upon the intricacies of a defendant's denial, is a more general
approach based on the factual transactions of a particular case. This
latter application of rule 608(b) may be drawn from the language
and prior history of the rule.
Rule 608(b) uses the requirement of probative value as an ex
plicit vehicle to determine an issue's collateral tenor. Earlier drafts
of rule 608(b) also included a requirement that the matter inquired
into by the cross-examiner not be "remote in time."1I3 A major rea
son for carving this phrase out of the text was the fear of introducing
. additional and unnecessary grounds for appeal. 114 Inclusion of the
language might have diminished the preferred approach of trusting
107. 347 U.S. at 63.
108. 420 U.S. at 716-17.
109. 347 U.S. at 64.
110. 269 U.S. at 29, 35.
111. 401 U.S. at 223.
112. 446 U.S. at 622-23.
113. FED. R. EVID. 608(b) (Revised Draft March IS, 1971), reprinted in 51 F.R.D.
315, 388-90 (1971).
114. 117 CONGo he. 33642, 33645 (1971) (letter from Sen. lohn L. McClellan to
Hon. Albert B. Maris (Aug. 12, 1971».
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the "common sense, fairness and discretion"lIS of the trial judge.
This history of rule 608(b), however, does not demand an automatic
discarding of the remoteness criterion, especially if such considera
tion is within the parameters of common sense, fairness, and discre
tion. Remoteness may also be implicit in the process of balancing
probative value against undue prejudice 116 under Federal Rule of
Evidence 403 (rule 403).117
In certain circumstances, remoteness in time can be a compo
nent of the trial judge's broad discretion in determining the proba
tive value and collateral nature of specific instances of conduct. The
remoteness component can be realized most effectively by using a
transactional approach to the fact paradigms of each case. When the
specific instance of conduct is part of the same transaction and oc
currence that gave rise to the charges for which a defendant-witness
is on trial, the court should be more amenable to admitting extrinsic
evidence. While technically collateral, the matter in controversy
may be closely related to the main issues in dispute. 1I8
A transactional evaluation of the collateral nature of an issue
provides a method for bridging the gap between the conflicting inter
pretations of rule 608(b). Where prior misdeeds fall within the trans
actional framework of the case, the minority rule 119 controls. This
means broader admissibility of extrinsic evidence. Prior misconduct,
falling outside the transactional framework, is treated in accord with
the majority viewpoint,120 which limits the use of extrinsic evidence.
This analysis may also be applied to the cases decided under the
exclusionary rule. The controversies surrounding the suppressed tee
shirt in Havens and the statements made in violation of the Miranda
warning in Harris and Hass materially bear upon the elements of the
crimes charged. The collateral nature of these minitrials tends to
abate when guilt or innocence pivots on a defendant's credibility.
Incidents connected to the suppressed evidence in Walder were
beyond the transactional frame of the facts that gave rise to the ar
rests and indictments. Walder's prior indictment, later dismissed,
bore no relation to his eventual trial other than the similarity of the
crimes charged in both arrests.121 Agnello. is a more difficult case
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id
United States v. McClintic, 570 F.ld 685, 691 n.6 (8th Cir. 1978).
FED. R. EVID. 403.
See United States v. Benedetto, 571 F.2d 1246 (ld Cir. 1978).
See notes 54-64 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 46-53 supra and accompanying text.
347 U.S. at 62-63.
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under this analysis since narcotics were seized from defendant's resi
dence within a short time after he had transported the packages that
allegedly contained narcotics. 122 The acts, however, that were the
basis of the arrests were completed before the police entered and
searched Agnello's house. 123 Thus, the transactions and occurrences
of the conspiracy were ended. Agnello did not deny that there was
cocaine in the packages. He merely denied having any knowledge of
the contents. His guilt or innocence did not pivot upon his credibil
ity with respect to the existence of cocaine. Admission of the tran
sactionally, collaterally tainted evidence rightfully was barred.
A trial judge should be cognizant of the rule 403 balancing pro
cess when faced with an offer of proof comprised of evidence subject
to suppression. Admitting such evidence or exposing its existence
could lead a jury to lend unwarranted credence to it at the risk of
convicting someone for being a "bad person"124 based on prior mis
deeds similar to those for which a defendant currently is on trial.
Suppressed evidence necessarily implicates an arrest, from which a
jury might wrongly infer guilt. The inference of guilt, which is not at
issue under rule 608(b), may be more imposing where the accused's
activities were suspicious enough to hue aroused the attention of the
police rather than that of a mere private citizen who ultimately may
testify against him. A jury might reflexively presume the correctness
of a police officer's decision to place a suspect under arrest. 125 The
jury, in addition, might be unduly influenced by suppressed physical
evidence such as displays of narcotics or related paraphemalia. 126
One pragmatic suggestion was offered by the Second Circuit in Bene
122.. 269 U.S. at 28-29.
123. Id at 31.
124. C.f. 571 F.2d 1246, 1248-49 (2d Cir. 1978) (danger of prejudice from evidence
of other crimes generally, rather than from suppressed evidence in particular).
125. A. YARMEY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY, 178-80 (1979).
Although law enforcement officials may not have as high a credibility rating as those in
some white collar professions, they are perceived as being more truthful than many blue
collar laborers. Id
126. C.f. United States v. Banks, 520 F.2d 627, 630 (7th Cir.1975) (emphasizing
"highly emotive" subjects such as narcotics use, "which carry with their very nature seri
ous dangers of undue prejudice").
This situation often is avoided since the owner of illegally seized property may de
mand its intmediate return. Physical evidence procured through an illegal search and
seizure may be particularly influential since evidence may be "just as reliable as evidence
obtained by legal means." Oaks, Studying 'he ExclUSionary Rule in Search and Seizure,
37 U. CHI. L. REv. 665, 666 (1970). The evidentiary trustworthiness of a package of
heroin is not impaired in the way a statement coerced in the absence of Miranda warn
ings may be. In the former situation, the evidence can still speak for itself. See also Y.
KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. IsRAEL, BASIC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 727 (4th ed. 1974).
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detto: "[A]dmission of such strongly prejudicial evidence should
normally await the conclusion of the defendant's case, since the
court will then be in the best position to balance to probative worth
of, and the Government's need for, such testimony against the
prejudice to the defendant."127 This may aid in abating the potential
for prejudice, but it far from vitiates the need for a rule 608(b) inter
pretation that will be responsive to the problems of suppressed
evidence.
A transactional interpretation of rule 608(b) provides a worka
ble method for diminishing prejudicial effects borne by tainted evi
dence. Its application is consistent with both the legislative history
and the policy behind the rule. Further, in the area of suppressed
evidence, a transactional approach aids in bridging the gap between
divergent interpretations of rule 608(b) as propounded by the circuit
courts.

v.

CONCLUSION
......
.~

The exclusionary rule of evidence is a doctrine originally cre
ated by the judiciary to protect the individual liberties granted by the
fourth and fifth amendments. The specific goal of the doctrine has
been two-fold: To protect society by discouraging errant police con
duct and to uphold the integrity of the judicial system.
A recent line of decisions by the United States Supreme Court
has altered the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule by permitting
limited use of improperly obtained evidence in the government's im
peachment case. These decisions have rendered the exclusionary
rule unable to perform as a functional deterrent of police misconduct
and have reduced the rule's ability to promote judicial integrity. In
addition, the rule is no longer an effective instrument to protect de
fendants at trial from the prejudice of illegally obtained evidence.
To solve the problems that resulted from the emasculation of
the exclusionary rule, Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) may be used
as an effective alternative to bar the prosecution's use of illegally ob
tained evidence. By defining a defendant-witness' participation in
the events relating to the improper procurement of evidence as spe
cific instances of his conduct, rule 608(b) can operate to overlay the
exclusionary rule in the government's impeachment case. Gaps left
by the exclusionary rule can thus be filled by rule 608(b) since each
rule, though overlapping, applies independently of the other.
127. United States v. Benedetto, 571 F.2d 1246, 1249 (2d Cir. 1978).
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Rule 608(b) can act effectively to bar tainted evidence where a
criminal defendant, as a result of solicitations by the cross-examiner,
utters a putative denial that is general and ambiguous. Tainted evi
dence would be prohibited as extrinsic provided that the defendant
does not raise a specific issue relating to the evidence and that such
issue is not germaine to the central issues in the case. This would
include, therefore, instances wherein a defendant voluntarily denies
a particular allegation either during his direct testimony or as an
unelicited statement on cross-examination. Concentrating on the dy
namics of a defendant's denial thus provides a method of applying
rule 608(b) consistent with the rule's primary objective to avoid un
warranted minitrials on tangential issues.
An alternative analysis of rule 608(b) that similarly can act to
alter the effects of the exclusionary rule focuses on the transactional
nature of a particular case. This approach can be used to determine
an issue's collateral nature and, consequently, whether extrinsic evi
dence must be barred. If the incidents rela~g to the illegal seizure
of evidence lie outside the factual fram~work of the central issues in
the case, such illegal evidence must be barred as extrinsic under rule
608(b). This application is consistent with the majority interpreta
tion of rule 608(b). The minority view would prevail, however,
when prior misdeeds fall within the framework of transactions and
occurrences that give rise to the charges for which a defendant-wit
ness stands trial.
The transactional theory finds its basis in the requirement of
elementary fairness and discretion by the trial judge with respect to
the probative value of proferred evidence. Implicit in the require
ments of discretion and probative value, by which rule 608(b) meas
ures an issue's collateral nature, is the remoteness criterion. This
element, removed from the rule by the drafters for technical reasons,
precludes inquiry by the cross-examiner if the subject matter is re
mote in time from the central issues at bar. The Jransactional ap
proach is an equitable method of employing the remoteness factor
since it, in tum, is grounded in the court's discretion and sense of
fairness.
When applying transactional theory of analysis to the cases de
cided under the exclusionary rule, it is important to consider whether
the illegal evidence in question is related materially to the elements
of the crimes charged. If such a material relationship exists, the pro
hibition against using the illegal evidence should become less oner
ous. In this situation, the threat of lapsing into unwanted minitrials
would be minimal.
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The use of evidence subject to suppression often raises the spec
tre of prejudice. A transactional theory operates to reduce such
prejudice. This approach, in addition, is consistent with the policy
behind rule 608(b), as well as with the divergent applications of the
rule by the circuit courts.
Whether applying rule 608(b) under a denial-dynamics ap
proach or a transactional approach, the rule can operate as an effec
tive response to some of the problems caused by illegally obtained
evidence.
Stuart R Friedman

